# Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning
Executive Overview Brief
January 2016

We traditionally see ourselves at either peace or war, with war being an undesirable exception.

War/Conflict

"The Campaign Effort"

**Peace**   **Peace**

In response, we're pre-disposed to seek a rapid, conclusive "end" and return to normalcy – even though that is not our historical experience.

At times, the DoD exhibits an incomplete understanding of war/conflict (Ex. our "first battles"). Moreover, we've created and maintained a framework to our liking – one in a manner of how we would prefer conflict to unfold, but not one reflecting reality.

*Within the defense community, this has led to a narrow and*

Is this a fair model of the universe of competitive Int'l Relations and Differing Styles of Warfare and Conflict?

- Do we understand how to campaign in this space?
- The ambiguity, diffusion of political power, and proliferation of lethal technologies presented in this space exacerbate the 'U.S. way of war'.
- Problems in Int'l Rel in this space don't necessarily lend themselves to rapid, decisive operations
- Success requires deep understanding, persistence, perseverance & adaptive and agile joint forces

Traditional / Conventional Warfare

Unconventional Warfare

More Severe

Consequence

Less Severe

WW II 1941
Iraq 2003
Korea 1950
WW I 1918
Iraq 1990
Grenada 1983
Panama 1989
North Korea 2015
China 2015
Civil War 1861
Iran 2015
Israel/Lebanon
Russia/Georgia 2008
Russia/Ukraine 2015
ISIS
Afghanistan 2007
AQ Pre-2001
Vietnam 1961
Columbia 1978
Yemen 2015
Dominican Republic 1965
Guatemala 1966
Libya 2011
Nicaragua 1912
Philippines 1899
Cold War 1945-1989

- We like to think we understand this space fairly well. We consider this style of warfare our strength/advantage
- Focused on state on state conflict using overwhelming military force to achieve total victory or unconditional surrender
- However, twice in the past 100 years, this has led to an Armistice condition.
- Resources and processes (man, equip, train, budget, institutions, laws, and authorities) are set up/optimized for this space
- Our experience is viewed as successful military operations with mostly enduring and acceptable outcomes

Political Warfare

Irregular Warfare

'Peace'

Spectrum of Competition and Conflict

'War'

Do we have adequate theories, concepts, tools, practices, and elements of design to campaign effectively across the entire spectrum of conflict and competition?

# Is the current "Notional Plan Phasing Construct" the tool that seeks to account for that universe?

Peace — **War/Conflict** — **Peace**

Plan Phases

Phase 0 Shape	Phase I Deter	Phase II Seize Initiative	Phase III Dominate	Phase IV Stabilize	Phase V Enable Civil Authority	Phase 0 Shape

Level of Military Effort

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

Global Shaping

OPLAN Approval	OPORD Activation	OPORD Execution	OPORD Termination

Elements of Operational Design

- Termination
- Military end state
- Objective
- Effects
- Center of gravity
- Decisive point
- Lines of operation and lines of effort

- Direct and indirect approach
- Anticipation
- Operational reach
- Culmination
- Arranging operations
- Forces and functions

Whether we meant it to be or not, this illustration has become a substitute campaign model across DoD.

JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning

4

When do we 'think' we actually campaign?

Peace ⟷ War/Conflict ⟷ Peace

Plan Phases

Phase 0 – Shaping
JP 1, JP 3-0, & JP 5-0 describe CCMDRs' actions in this space as "routine and normal activities"

| Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority | Phase 0 Shape |

Level of Military Effort

- Enabling Civil Authority Activity
- Dominating Activities
- Stabilizing Activities
- Seizing the Initiative Activities
- Deterring Activities
- Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

Global Shaping

OPLAN Approval — OPORD Activation — OPORD Execution — OPORD Termination

…the model suggests that either DoD is either at peace or waging warfare... but accounts ... duties as:

"CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders.
During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required.
During a conflict/combat, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions." –JP 1-0.

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Where do we focus our institutional attention?

Peace — War/Conflict — Peace

DoD's philosophy, processes, intellectual efforts, focus on and optimize for Phases II and III. Of course for good reasons, but we can account for more.

"Steady-State"??   "Sustained Conflict"?   Post-Conflict?

What comes after military success?
## What do we tell ourselves we do after achieving military success?

Peace — War/Conflict — Peace

At times, DoD sees this space as discretionary. Alternatively, history demonstrates that it's a very demanding and essential part of the campaign/conflict.

... must help create conditions to achieve or enable desirable and sustainable ...

Assessing this space as "optional" doesn't alleviate the risks resonant and posed by these conditions; nor that we won't have to conduct missions required in this space.

CCDRs consistently execute tasks normally associated with phases IV and V throughout Phase Zero.

"Steady-State"??   "Sustained Conflict"?   **Re-characterization**

Thoughts on Termination and Military Endstate

Peace — **War/Conflict** — **Peace**

Plan Phases

| Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority | Phase 0 Shape |

Level of Military Effort

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

?

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

Global Shaping

OPLAN Approval — OPORD Activation — OPORD Execution — OPORD Termination

In one area of our joint doctrinal prose, we say the military endstate is used to define termination criteria; in another area, we say termination criteria defines the military endstate. Moreover, we say POTUS/SECDEF "give" us the termination criteria; however, analysis of our model suggests these terms are fairly synonymous, but not centered on or tied to achieving a sustainable political outcome.

An Incongruent Trinity
The Relationship of Military End State, Termination, and Realizing the Aim-

Plan Phases

| Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority | Phase 0 Shape |

Level of Military Effort

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Military End State 🟠 ?

Termination ⚫ ?

Realize Aim* ⭐ ?

How has the US effectively turned military victory into achievement of the aim and favorable, sustainable success?

War/Conflict
Success/Armistice
Re-Characterization Of the Conflict
Migration
New and Favorable Conditions
Transition
Acceptable Security Situation
Bi-lateral partnership
Enduring Commitment

Perpetuation

Advantageous Political Outcome

Phase II Seize Initiative
Phase III Dominate
Phase IV Stabilize
Phase V Enable Civil Authority
Phase 0 Shape

Enabling Civil Authority Activity
Dominating Activities
Stabilizing Activities
Seizing the Initiative Activities
...ing Activities
...ng Activities

Consolidation
Consolidation
Consolidation

First of all, a sustainable outcome(s) is the aim of every campaign, not simply the destruction of the adversaries'
war-making capability, or merely to attain a Military Endstate and then seek Termination.   Successful US-led campaigns account for the deep understanding required, amount of force needed, and time necessary to deliver/enable sustainable outcomes as we move from sustained conflict through a re-characterization period; to creating favorable conditions(when we do it right); then to acceptable security situations; and later to a partnership and an enduring commitment to perpetuate our gains/realized advantage. Furthermore, successful campaigns seek to consolidate gains as they materialize. Consolidation isn't elective or discretionary, its required and

# Trend of U.S. Consolidation/Commitment Beyond Armed Conflict
1898-2015

- *Accomplishing just military objectives doesn't necessarily lead to political aims or to the termination of military operations in support and sustainment of those policy goals. The aspect of finality is elusive.*

- *Success requires a continued level of military effort beyond sustained conflict to consolidate gains in order to realize/enable the political outcome in the dynamic conditions following military success, and afterwards, perpetuate and sustain that outcome.*

- *History shows that U.S. forces continue to operate long after the cessation of sustained armed conflict, sometimes for years or decades. Joint Force presence enables the other elements of national power.*

* In many instances the conflict phase took only weeks or months to achieve - far less than the "1 year" annotation depicts. Often there was little or no major combat activity and consolidation activities began immediately.

Chart data (years of conflict / consolidation-commitment):

Campaign	Conflict	Consolidation/Commitment
War on Terror 2002		
Afghanistan 2001		
Bosnia/Kosovo 1992		
Haiti 1994		
Somalia 1992		13
Iraq 1990		13
Panama 1989		2
Persian Gulf 1987		3
Grenada 1983		25
Honduras 1983		4
Sinai 1982	15	3
Lebanon 1982	1	6
El Salvador 1981	4	33
Columbia 1978	1	1
Dominican Republic 1965	1	11
Vietnam 1961	1	32
Lebanon 1958	1	2
Formosa 1950	1	5
Korea 1950	1	62
Japan 1941	1	70
Austria 1941	1	10
Italy 1941	11	70
Germany 1941	1	70
Nicaragua 1926	3	7
Panama 1918	4	2
Russia 1918	4	2
Rhineland 1917	4	5
Cuba 1917	4	6
Dominican Republic 1916	1	8
Haiti 1915	1	19
Mexico 1914	1	5
Nicaragua 1912	1	12
Panama 1903	1	11
China 1900	1	40
Phillipines 1899	3	11
Cuba 1898	1	3

Legend: Conflict / Consolidation/Commitment

17 Aug 2015

Where do we think we see risk across the model?

Peace — War/Conflict — Peace

DoD views the preponderance of risk occurring in Phase III.

"Steady-State"??   "Sustained Conflict"?   Re-Characterization

JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning

Where do we see risk?

Peace   **War/Conflict**   **Peace**

Plan Phases

| Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority | Phase 0 Shape |

Level of Military Effort

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

Global Shaping

OPLAN Approval   OPORD Activation   OPORD Execution   OPORD Termination

"Steady-State"   "Real War"   Re-Characterization

Is there risk across all three spaces?

13

Are they really operating within our Phase 0? Or….

Peace **War/Conflict** **Peace**

Adaptive enemies are countering our model by operating below our thresholds for action and avoiding our strengths

More and more, we are realizing there is no such thing as a steady-state, only varying degrees of dynamic states as a function of the "continual ebb and flow of international relations"

...rent model is based on how we "wish" campaigning and conflict unfolded, for the style of ...d prefer to fight. However, it doesn't reflect the US' historical experience or reality. It does...he most effective and informed application of the joint force or the Pentagon's essential ...onal processes. Finally, using this model throughout joint education constrains or even inh...eader development.

Chinese SCS Coercion

Russian Aggression

nK Provocation

Iranian Influence

Plan Phases

Phase 0 Shape · Phase I Deter · Phase II Seize Initiative · Phase III Dominate · Phase IV Stabilize · Phase V Enable Civil Authority · Phase 0 Shape

Level of Military Effort

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

TCP

GCP

?

State and non-state adversarial approaches are accomplishing wartime-like objectives beyond the reach, authorization, and effectiveness of existing theater campaign efforts and US law, title, and code but far short of provoking the US toward seeking a legitimate Int'l community charter(such as an UNSCR or NATO Defense Treaty Article) or unilateral response. Our current philosophy of campaigning doesn't recognize this nuance. An alternative model must enable the US to legitimately campaign in this space to actually counter and defeat adversary approaches

The Frustration of Alternative Styles of Warfare

- "Hybrid warfare is a term that sought to capture the blurring and blending of previously separate categories of conflict. It uses a blend of military, economic, diplomatic, criminal, and informational means to achieve desired political goals."

- " The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, has referred to these hybrid threats as an "inflection point" in modern war. Indeed, in the disordered post-Cold War world, hybrid warfare remains an excellent framework for understanding the changing character of war(fare)."

- "The concept,…. allows NATO to avoid action because a range of activities – from the aggressive use of disinformation by Moscow, to economic pressure, to bribery and threats, to use of "locals" to stir up protests – become conveniently categorized as being under the threshold of war. Indeed as one expert, James Sherr, has observed,… Russia(n) hybrid warfare could "cripple a state before that state even realizes the conflict had begun," and yet it manages to "slip under NATO's threshold of perception and reaction." Sherr is right."

- Hybrid threats provide the "perfect" conundrum: the injection of so much uncertainty that NATO collapses under its own principle of allied consensus. At what point does the alliance decide if the Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaite, is correct when she remarked that Lithuania was "already under attack," with the first stage of confrontation taking place – informational war, propaganda and cyber attack?

-Dr. Nadia Schadlow, "The Problem with Hybrid War", War on the Rocks, 2 April
(http://warontherocks.com/2015/04/the-problem-with-hybrid-warfare/

Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict
According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
-Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War)	-Military action starts by groups during peacetime (War is not declared at all)
-Frontal Clashed between large units consisting mostly of ground units	-Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable inter-specific fighting groups
-Defeat of Manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control	Annihilation of the enemy's military power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure
-Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation	-Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.)
-Combat operations on land, sea, and air	
-Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance	-Use of armed civilians (4 civilians; 1 military)
	- Simultaneous strike on the enemies units and -facilities in all of the territory
	-Use of Asymmetric and indirect methods
	Management of troops in a unified informational spher Sphere.

Berzins, Janis, "Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Defense Policy" The Journal of Military Operations – discussions on the Conduct of War. Pp. 4-7 The IJ Infinity Group. Tel Aviv, 2014.

Main Guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by 2020...

1. From direct destruction to direct influence
2. From direct annihilation of the opponent to its "inner decay" (and will)
3. From a war with weapons and technology to a culture of war
4. Form a war with conventional forces to specifically prepared forces and
   commercial irregular groupings
5. From the traditional (3D) battle ground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions.
6. From direct clash to "contactless war"
7. From a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's side and base
8. From war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace
9. From symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns
10. From a war in defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

Modern Russian Approach
Compared to DoD's JOPES Phasing Construct (Bins vs. Phases)

Invisible

Visible

Bin #4

Destabilize thru propaganda to increase
discontent,
boosted by the arrival of
"bands" of
manipulating
an.

Bin #3

Coercion & Undermining
Bribe, Intimidate,
Deceive government
and military officials

Bin #8

Roll over the remaining points of
resistance and destroy surviving
enemy units by special operations

Bin #7

Combined targeted information,
electronic warfare &
aerospace ops
continuous air force harassment,
with the use of high-tech weapons

Bin #2

Info/Diplomatic Deception
Confuse/Stymie/Mislead
Adversary's understanding
and decision making

Bin #6

Commence military action
w/ all types, forms,
methods, and forces.
Preceded by large scale recon
and subversive missions.

Bin #1

Non-military asymmetric
warfare - "Favorable
POL/MIL & economic
setup"

Bin #5

Establish of no-fly zones over
the adversary's country,
impose blockades, Extensive
use of private military companies
in close cooperation with armed
opposition units

text of employment, these groupings of activities seem more like bins of tool boxes or capa
Russians apply based on local/area METT-TC as opposed to sequential and mechanical phase

Does the current campaign framework "substitute" help us think through the military's role and contribution in countering our potential adversaries' modern styles of warfare?

War/Conflict

"The Campaign Effort"

Invisible

Bin #4
Destabilize thru propaganda to increase discontent, boosted by the arrival of "bands" of militaries, escalating subversion.

Bin #3
Coercion & Undermining
Bribe, Intimidate, Deceive government and military officials

Bin #2
Info/Diplomatic Deception
Confuse/Stymie/Mislead Adversary's understanding and decision making

Bin #1
Non-military asymmetric warfare - "Favorable POL/MIL & economic setup"

Visible

Bin #8
Roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations

Bin #7
Combined targeted information, electronic warfare & aerospace ops continuous air force harassment, with the use of high-tech weapons

Bin #6
Commence military action w/ all types, forms, methods, and forces. Preceded by large scale recon and subversive missions.

Bin #5
Establish of no-fly zones over the adversary's country, impose blockades, Extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.

Peace

Peace

The Russian "New Gen" Approach compared to how we prefer conflict to unfold

What the Russians are willing to pursue against our partners' interests in the space that we want to consider "peacetime" is dramatic.

Many nations, including our possible adversaries don't have the same bi-furcated view that they are either at peace or war. They see their actions "…as a natural part of the ebb and flow of international relations "

ver3

Are we seeing other similar approaches unfolding?

War/Conflict

"The Campaign Effort"

Coercion, Provocation cycle, Mal-influence ISIL

Peace

Peace

It's not too hard to intellectually place the Chinese, nK, ISIL, and Iranian unfolding activities in the same space.

What are the Joint Forces' capabilities and range of activities within in the theater campaign's current description?

Public Affairs

Civil Affairs

Coop w/ NGOs

HA/DR

SSA
FID
FMO

NEO

MIL Engagement

MN Exercises

MIS
IO

Missile Defense

IAD

Detect Threat Networks

CT
1206

MIL Deception

COIN/SFA

Counter WMD

Intel Sharing

Precision Strike

UW

R&S

Personnel Recovery

Raids

EW

ISR

Strategic Deploy

What do our bins of capabilities look like? What should the bins look like? Are these "tools" really integrated or synchronized within a coherent model for campaigning beyond traditional
armed conflict? Are these just functional activities employed wherever they can be "squeezed in", toward loosely or ill-defined objectives? Can we organize, authorize, and arrange these capabilities to counter the adversaries

Don't we need to actually campaign in all spaces?, Do we continue campaigning after sustained hostilities subside?

Peace ← → Peace

War/Conflict

Plan Phases

Level of Military Effort

Phase 0 Shape | Phase I Deter | Phase II Seize Initiative | Phase III Dominate | Phase IV Stabilize | Phase V Enable Civil Authority | Phase 0 Shape

???

???

Enabling Civil Authority Activity

Dominating Activities

Stabilizing Activities

Seizing the Initiative Activities

Deterring Activities

Shaping Activities

Theater Shaping

-**Have we properly defined this space we currently refer to as Phase 0? How about Phases IV/V and beyond.**

-**Do we have a clear understanding and framework of how to campaign in these spaces?   What is our Theory of Shaping? What is the Joint Force's Theory of Consolidation?**

-**Do we currently recognize and appreciate the requirements and demands beyond "just" military victory to actually translate that success into real outcomes?**

JP 5-0, Joint Operational Planning

Are we really accounting for the universe of competitive International Relations and Conflict in our model?

Traditional / Conventional Warfare

Unconventional Warfare

More Severe

Consequence

Less Severe

Political Warfare

Irregular Warfare

WW II 1941
Iraq 2003
Korea 1950
WW I 1918
Iraq 1990
Grenada 1983
Panama 1989
North Korea 2015
China 2015
Civil War 1861
Israel/Lebanon
Russia/Georgia 2008
Iran 2015
Russia/Ukraine 2015
ISIS
Afghanistan 2007
AQ Pre-2001
Vietnam 1961
Columbia 1978
Yemen 2015
Dominican Republic 1965
Guatemala 1966
Lybia 2011
Nicaragua 1912
Philippines 1899
Cold War 1945-1989

'Peace'   Spectrum of Competition and Conflict   'War'

Are we effectively preparing future joint leaders?

Emerging Examples of
Alternative Campaigning Models will
seek to describe, illustrate, and account for:

Traditional / Conventional Warfare

Unconventional Warfare

Iraq 2003

Korea 1950

WW I 1918

1. An expanded & relevant array of elements of joint operational design (true campaign design)

2. A methodology/description for the idea of shaping

3. A methodology for translating military success into sustainable outcomes.

4. The interdependence needed to achieve sustainable outcomes.

5. Ideas for embedded assessment

6. That political aims will continually evolve.

7. The NMS' expanded view of the continuum of conflict.

8. Hybrid relationships. (Flexible command relationships)

9. Multiple aspects of risks of non action, risk of strategic failure, risk of changed environment

after operations, risks missed opportunities.

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